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GOVERNMENTAL REGULATION
OF MEDICAL DECISION-MAKING:
All In The Name of Baby Doe
by JoAnn Harri
Due to advances in neonatal medical technology, the
survival rate for premature and critically ill newborns has
increased dramatically over the past quarter of a century.
Children who twenty-five years ago would have died well
before their first birthday, now often survive. Unfortunate-
ly, their survival is often occasioned by severe medical
disorders, such as: anencephaly,' hydranencephaly,2 spina
bifida cystica 3 complicated by hydrocephalus, 4 men-
ingomyelocele,5 Downs Syndrome6 complicated by duo
denal atresia,7 microcephaly,8 and myeloschisis.9 In many
of these cases, parents and physicians have quietly and
privately chosen non-treatment or conservative rather than
aggressive forms of treatment and have, through omission,
brought about the death of their premature or disabled
newborn.
This situation has spawned philosophical, social and
ethical implications which extend far beyond the control
of either the courts or the government. Nevertheless, the
Federal government, in the form of the U.S. Department
of Health and Human Services (HHS) has attempted to
control this decision-making process by enacting regulations
which make it unlawful to discriminate against a handicap-
ped newborn solely on the basis of their handicap. These
regulations, commonly referred to as the "Baby Doe Regula-
tions were first issued in May 1982, pursuant to § 504
of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. I The Baby Doe Regula-
tions were initially promulgated as an interim final rule in
March 1983,12 subsequently invalidated by the D.C. Circuit
in April 1983,'3 reissued in July 1983, 4 published as a final
rule in January 1984,'5 and again invalidated by the Eastern
District 6 and Southern District' 7 of New York in February
and December 1984, respectively. The government
appealed the Southern District opinion in March 1985 and
the Supreme Court heard oral arguments on January 15,
1986. A decision is expected by July. The narrow issue to
be decided by the Supreme Court is whether § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 authorizes governmental con-
trol of medical and parental decision-making. '
JoAnn Harri is a J.D. Candidate; May 1986, State University of
New York at Buffalo. This paper was written for a Law, Science,
and Medicine seminar.
History and Substance of the Regulations
Parents and physicians have long made private treat-
ment decisions regarding their premature or defective
newborn, 9 in fact, some commentators have suggested that
this practice is merely a continuation of the historical prac-
tice of infanticide.2"
However, an article published in the New England Jour-
nal of Medicine in 1973 made the practice of selective non-
treatment of handicapped newborns public, and helped trig-
ger the current legal and ethical debate.2' In this article, the
authors, two well-respected doctors at Yale New Haven
Hospital, revealed the fact that newborns are often allowed
to die, or are treated conservatively rather than aggressive-
ly, if they are extremely premature or severely disabled. As
the authors explained in their introduction:
The experiences described in this communica-
tion document some of the grave moral and
ethical dilemmas now faced by physicians and
families. They indicate some of the problems
in a large, special-care nursery where "informed'
parents influence the management decisions
concerning their infants.22
This article, along with a highly publicized Bloom-
ington, Indiana case,23 prompted President Reagan to send
a memorandum to the Attorney General and Secretary of
HHS on April 30, 1982. The memorandum cited the
Bloomington, Indiana case and noted that Federal law pro-
hibits discrimination against the handicapped.24
In response, on May 18, 1982, HHS wrote a letter to
approximately 7,000 hospitals putting them on notice that
it was "unlawful" (under §504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973) for a recipient of Federal financial assistance to
withhold from a handicapped infant nutritional sustenance
or medical or surgical treatment required to correct a life-
threatening condition if. (1) the withholding is based on the
fact that the infant is handicapped; and (2) the handicap
does not render treatment or nutritional sustenance con-
traindicated. 25 The penalty for noncompliance was the
possible loss of Federal funds. In March 1983, ten months
later, HHS issued detailed, follow-up, emergency regulations
which required the substance of the May 1982 letter to be
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displayed conspicuously in every delivery ward, maternity
ward, pediatric ward, nursery and intensive care nursery.
26
Included in the notice was a toll-free, 24 hour a day "hotline7
number that individuals with knowledge of any handicap-
ped infant being discriminatorily denied food or customary
medical care were encouraged to call. The regulations pro-
vided HHS officials with authority to take "immediate
remedial action" to protect the infant (contrary to the nor-
mal 10-day waiting period required by 45 CFR 80.8(d)(3)).
In addition, hospitals were required to provide access to
their premises and medical records to agency investigators,
at any time (once again, contrary to the normal business
hour rule enunciated in 45 CFR 80.6(c)). These modifica-
tions, explained HHS, "were necessary to protect life from
imminent harm. 27
Responses to the Federal regulations were fairly predict-
able. Some, but not all, of the favorable responses came
from pro-life organizations. 28 By contrast, a number of child
advocacy groups, although supportive of the basic thrust
of the regulations, objected to the method of enforcement,
29
and many medical organizations firmly opposed the regula-
tions, finding them both unnecessary and troublesome."0
The interim final rule was scheduled to become effec-
tive on March 22, 1983, only fifteen days following its
publication. However, on March 18, the American Academy
of Pediatrics and others brought suit against HHS and
Secretary Margaret Heckler to enjoin enforcement of the
rule US. District Court Judge Gesell denied the temporary
restraining order, but agreed to hear the case on April 8.
Six days later the court held that the interim final rule was
invalid because it failed to satisfy the requirements of the
Administrative Procedure Act 31 The court determined that
the rule was a product of "haste and inexperience,'32 and
that many relevant factors, including the scope of § 504,
were not considered. The court also determined that the
Secretary had failed to follow the procedural requirements
of 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) and (d).33 For these reasons, the court
determined that the interim final rule was an arbitrary and
capricious abuse of agency decision-making in violation of
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)
3 4
The Administration did not appeal the decision, but
rather revised the regulations and reissued them in early
July as proposed rules. 5
The proposed rules were almost identical to the
original, with the exception of the following minor changes:
1. The hotline notice need only be posted at "each
nurses station" as compared with "each delivery ward,
maternity ward, pediatric ward, nursery and intensive care
nursery," as required by the original notice
2. The minimum size requirement for the notice was
reduced to 8.5 by 11 inches;
3. The state child protection agency's phone number
was added to the notice
4. An entirely new section was added mandating that
each states child protective services agency establish pro-
cedures designed to prevent medical neglect of handicapped
infants.
3 6
The only substantive modification appeared in the Ap-
pendix to the proposed rules, in which HHS listed several
examples of decisions that would, in its view, constitute
violations of § 504 .7 These examples reflect the limited
application of the regulations. As one commentator noted:
Because the regulations were written in res-
ponse to the Bloomington, Indiana case, they
fail to reflect the range of congenital anomalies
that occur in Neonatal Intensive Care Units and
they fail to distinguish between handicaps that
call for curative or corrective treatment and han-
dicaps that do not call for treatment because
they cannot be cured or corrected. 8
HHS received over 16,000 comments to the proposed
rules, of which it categorized 97.5% as supportive However,
of the 141 pediatricians who responded, 72% opposed the
regulation, as did 77% of the responding hospital officials
and health-related organizations.3 9
HHS responded to the comments on January 12, 1984
by issuing its final rules,40 which contain several modifica-
tions of the proposed rules. The first modification provides
a standard of care requiring "medically beneficial treat-
ment: 4' This change responded to the most obvious defi-
ciency of the original regulations; it provided no guidance
at all to physicians regarding their legal obligations, other
than to mandate that they follow custom. The final rules
do not make clear, however, what constitutes "medically
beneficial treatment,' other than to say that it must be deter-
mined with respect for reasonable medical judgments. Nor
do the final rules make clear whether quality of life
judgments can be used to determine the existence of a
medical benefit.
The second set of changes is merely cosmetic. It
reduces the size of the notice to "no smaller than 5 by 7
inches" and changes the location to "where nurses . . .
will see it"42 This change is an obvious response to the af-
front many physicians and hospital administrators felt In
being forced to post the original notice in a more public
place.
The only meaningful addition to the final rules Is the
advisory model Infant Care Review Committee (ICRC) con-
tained in the Appendix. According to the regulations, ICRCs
are designed "to assist hospitals in the development of stan-
dards, policies and procedures for providing treatment to
handicapped infants and in making decisions concerning
medically beneficial treatment in specific cases." However,
ICRCs "are not designed to be a substitute for mechanisms
to enforce § 504."43 The committees are merely expected
to develop treatment guidelines and review specific cases
brought to it by those involved in the treatment decision.
The idea for a model ethical review committee did not
originate with HHS, quite the contrary. In late April 1985,
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the American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP) released their
Guidelines for Infant Bioethics Committees, and urged all
hospitals to establish such committees." In fact, the AAP
Guidelines were developed in response to the original Baby
Doe Regulations, and as an alternative to them. Prior to
that, in 1983, the President's Commission for the Study
of Ethical Problems in Medicine suggested that in difficult
cases, an ethics committee or similar body might be as-
signed to review the decision-making process in neonatal
intensive care units.
45
There are difficulties inherent in any bureaucratic ethical
review committee; however, these difficulties are especially
apparent in the HHS model.
Ethical review committees are generally too cumber-
some and inept to provide the rapid decision-making
necessary to the life and death decisions made in a neonatal
nursery. In addition, the existence of ethical review com-
mittees necessarily means a reduction of parental autonomy
and physician discretion. The HHS model is even more
problematic in that it is heavily weighed in favor of con-
tinued treatment If the family refuses consent, but the ICRC
disagrees with the family (whether or not the family is sup-
ported in its decision by the physician), the ICRC is ex-
pected to recommend to the hospital that a court or child
protective agency be notified.
The model is further biased in that HHS perceives the
ICRC as its local investigatory arm, noting in the Appen-
dix that its investigators will make immediate contact with
the ICRC when a complaint is made to get the ICRC's ver-
sion of the case, and that HHS "may require a subsequent
written version of the ICRCs findings accompanied by per-
tinent records and documentation"
46
For these reasons, the HHS model cannot provide
hospitals with the impartiality and independence necessary
to the maintenance of an effective ethical review commit-
tee. Instead, the HHS model would merely serve to extend
governmental control of parental and medical
decision-making.
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Traditional Legal Standards and
Their Relationship to the Regulations
The essential problem with the HHS regulations or
with any Federal or State law which mandates medical treat-
ment for all handicapped infants is that it obscures the fact
that decisions about neonatal medical treatment are fun-
damentally moral decisions that deal with complex situa-
tions which cannot be decided by simplistic Federal
mandates.
Traditionally, the law has presumed that parents act
with the "best interests of their children"47 in mind. However,
this deference is not absolute. In particular, where it can
be shown that parents have abused or neglected their
children or where there is substantial reason to believe that
they will do so, the state acting under its parens patriae
powers can intervene.
48
Historically, physicians, hospitals and state agencies
have gone to court when parents refused medical treatment,
even where the treatment conflicts with the parents' religious
beliefs,49 the child's life is not in imminent threat of danger
and neither the child nor the parents believed that treat-
ment was medically indicated."0 Courts have intervened and
ordered treatment over parental objections in numerous life
threatening situations."1 The state may intervene to insure
that a child is given proper medical treatment in life-
threatening situations where the custodian of the child has
unreasonably refused to allow such treatment.5 2 And in
cases where there was no immediate threat to a child's life,
some courts have ordered treatment when it is reasonable
to assume that the child's physical health will be seriously
impaired and cannot be satisfactorily treated at a later
time.5
3
It appears that courts have and will continue to respond
to the ethical and moral dilemmas presented by the critically
ill newborn in a reasonably flexible and equitable manner.
The HHS regulations, however, as one commentator noted:
are difficult to apply to the decisions made in
Neonatal Intensive Care Units and virtually im-
possible to defend in courts of law . . . As
high as the stakes are in cases of selective non-
treatment, the question is whether federal legal
intervention is the best way of handling the
problem.
4
Application and Subsequent Invalidation
of the Regulations
Baby Jane Doe was born on October 11, 1983 at St.
Charles Hospital in Port Jefferson, New York. She was suf-
fering from multiple birth defects, the most serious of which
were spina bifida, microcephaly, and hydrocephalus." In
addition, she exhibited a "weak face,' which prevented her
from closing her eyes or making a full suck with her tongue,
a malformed brain stem, upper extremity spasticity, and
a thumb entirely within her fist. Her physician recommend-
ed immediate surgery to reduce the fluid in her skull and
close the cystic lesion on her spine. The surgery could in-
crease her life expectancy from a matter of weeks to twen-
ty years, but it would not correct the expected handicap-
ping conditions including severe retardation, (so severe, in
fact, that there was an extremely high risk she would never
be able to interact with her environment or other people),
epilepsy, paralysis, incontinence and constant urinary tract
infections.
At the direction of the first pediatric neurosurgeon to
examine her, the baby was transferred to State University
Hospital at Stony Brook for surgery. However, after lengthy
consultations with several physicians, nurses, religious ad-
visors, a social worker, and members of the family, the
parents decided to forego the corrective surgery, opting in-
stead for "conservative" medical treatment consisting of
good nutrition, the administration of antibiotics, and the
dressing of the baby's exposed spinal sac. The physicians
agreed with both the reasonableness and appropriateness
of this decision. However, on October 16, A. Lawrence
Washburn, Jr., a Vermont attorney and right-to-lifer
unrelated to the child and the family, acted on a confiden-
tial tip and commenced a proceeding in New York State
Supreme Court seeking appointment of a guardian ad litem
for the child and an order directing the hospital to perform
the surgery. The trial judge, Melvyn Tanenbaum, who had
accepted the Right-to-Life party nomination when he ran
for Judgeship in November 1982, appointed attorney
William E. Weber as guardian ad litem to represent the
child, and held a hearing on October 20 to determine
whether Baby Jane Doe was "in need of immediate surgical
procedure to preserve her life." Weber, who the night before
the hearing had told the parents he agreed with their deci-
sion, reversed himself at the hearing and argued for im-
mediate treatment on the basis that the medical records
disagreed with what the physicians had told him and the
parents about the child's prognosis. The court concluded
that surgery was necessary and authorized Weber to con-
sent to it. The parents appealed.
One day later the Appellate Division reversed Judge
Tanenbaurrs decision, ruling that the parents! decision was
considered with the best interests of the child in mind, and
therefore, there was no basis for judicial intervention. The
court found both that the child was not "in imminent danger
of death" and that the recommended shunt and spinal
closure carried their own risks, including loss "of what little
function remains in her legs"
6
Seven days later, the New York Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the Appellate Division, relying on
different grounds. The Court of Appeals ruled that Judge
Tanenbaum had abused his discretion in hearing the case,
because Petitioner Washburn had "no disclosed relation-
ship with the child, her parents, her family, or those treating
her illness" The court ruled that allegations of child abuse
or neglect must be made to the Statds Department of Social
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Services for appropriate investigation, and since petitioner
had failed to do this, dismissed the suit on these procedural
grounds.
57
While the State Court proceedings were still in pro-
gress, HHS received a 'hotline complaint from an unidenti-
fled private citizen that Baby Jane Doe was being
discriminatorily denied medically indicated treatment on the
basis of her handicaps. I-HS referred the complaint to the
New York State Child Protective Services, which on
November 7 determined that there was no cause for State
intervention. Prior to this, HHS had obtained a copy of the
record of the State Court proceedings, which contained the
child's medical records through October 19. After personally
reviewing the records, Surgeon General Everett Koop con-
cluded that he could not determine the basis for denial of
treatment, including whether it was based solely on the
child's handicap, without 'immediate access tc and careful
review of current medical records . . " Therefore, begin-
ning on October 22, HI-IS repeatedly requested that Univer-
sity Hospital make available all of Baby Jane Dods medical
records since October 19 so it could conduct a § 504 in-
vestigation."8 The hospital refused, basing its decision, in
part, on the refusal of the parents to release the records
and, in part, on "serious concerns both as to the Depart-
ment's jurisdiction and the procedures it has employed in
initiating an inquiry.
The government then brought this action on November
2 to obtain the child's medical records, alleging that Univer-
sity Hospital had violated § 504 and 45 C.ER. § 80.6(c)
by refusing to allow HHS access to information regarding
the medical care and hospital services being rendered to
the infant.5 9 The parents intervened as defendants, and
both the hospital and the parents moved to dismiss the
complaint.
60
The District Court determined that the hospital was
not in violation of § 504. The court focused on whether
or not it could be "clearly determined" from the record that
the hospital was not in violation of § 504. The court con-
cluded that the hospital failed to perform the surgery not
because of the child's handicap, but because of parental
refusal. The court also found the decision of the parents
"reasonable' based on "the medical options available and
on a genuine concern for the "best interests of the child:
6 1
The government appealed, arguing that the hospital
has a duty under § 504 to seek judicial review of a paren-
tal refusal to consent to surgery.62 The parents and hospital
argued that § 504 was never intended to serve as a basis
for governmental intervention in medical decision-making.
63
In responding to these arguments, the Court of Ap-
peals narrowed its focus to one central issue: "Did Con-
gress intend § 504 to reach the conduct HHS seeks to in-
vestigate?"64 The court determined that § 504 did not give
HHS any authority to interfere with treatment decisions in-
volving defective newborn infants. Specifically, the court
held that "requiring the hospital either to undertake surgery
notwithstanding the parents' decision or alternatively to
petition the state court to override the parents' decision,
would impose a particularly onerous affirmative action
burden on the hospital"65 In this way, the court reasoned,
governmental regulation of medical decisionmaking in the
case of critically ill infants is an unintended and unwarranted
imposition of affirmative treatment obligations which can
not be upheld. In reaching this conclusion, the court
assumed, without deciding, that § 504 applied to the
hospital's neonatal intensive care unit because the hospital
received Medicaid and Medicare payments.
66
The Court of Appeals opinion contains a detailed
analysis of the regulatory history, legislative history,
statutory language and case-law interpretation of § 504.
The court began its analysis by discussing the
regulatory history of HHS and its predecessor the U.S.
Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW), with
respect to § 504. In 1976, HEW adopted the position that
§ 504 does not give it authority to regulate regarding pa-
tients' rights to 'receive or refuse treatment" Rather, HEWs
authority was simply to make services accessible to the
handicapped, so as to provide them with an equal oppor-
tunity to receive educational and vocational benefits. In May
1977 HEW explained the nature of the non-discrimination
requirement imposed by § 504.
One common misconception about the regula-
tion is that it would require specialized hospitals
and other health care providers to treat all hand-
icapped persons. The regulation makes no such
requirement.67
In fact, it was not until the May, 1983 letter to hospitals
that HHS first took the position that § 504 might extend
to medical treatment decisions.6 8 "In sum" the court con-
cluded, "the regulatory history of § 504 is inconclusive.
HHS's current view of the scope of the statute is flatly at
odds with the position originally taken by HEW 69
The court then continued its analysis by inquiring into
the language, legislative history and congressional intent
of § 504.
With respect to the language of § 504, the court deter-
mined that in order to find discrimination, three criteria must
be met: (1) the existence of a handicap, (2) an otherwise
qualified individual, and (3) discrimination based on the
handicap. The court observed that it is not entirely clear
what "otherwise qualified" means in the context of a medical
treatment decision. The court reasoned that the statutory
language does not seem to encompass cases like Baby Jane
Doe Although a seriously ill newborn is handicapped, it
is only otherwise qualified for treatment because of the
existence of the handicap. For there to be discrimination,
there must be at least two classes of patients. Here there
was only one, those suffering from the handicap.
In contrast, the government argued that there were two
classes of patients: those suffering from spina bifida with
a reasonable prognosis for intellectual development, and
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those like Baby Jane Doe who suffered additional handi-
caps that made severe retardation possible.
70
With respect to the legislative history and congressional
intent of § 504, the court determined that Congress had
"never contemplated that § 504 would apply to treatment
decisions of this nature' I In fact, the legislative history of
§ 504 "is devoid of discussion of the treatment of serious-
ly ill newborns.' The purpose of § 504 was "to develop and
implement through research, training, services and the
guarantee of equal opportunity, comprehensive and co-
ordinated programs of vocational rehabilitation and in-
dependent living.'72 Thus, concluded the court, the Act
specifically contemplates a goal of equal employment op-
portunities, rather than standards of medical treatment.
In contrast, the government argued that § 504 was
enacted to prevent recipients of Federal aid from basing their
decisions regarding the distribution of services and benefits
on stereotypes and prejudices concerning the limitations
of major life activities faced by the handicapped. Section
504, according to HHS, was enacted to eliminate considera-
tion of the handicap itself from all decision-making, whether
it involves access to educational opportunities or distribu-
tion of medical benefits.
Finally, the court analyzed the case law interpretation
of § 504, beginning with the Supreme Court's opinion in
Southeastern Community College v. Davis. In Davis, the
Supreme Court emphasized that "the language and
structure of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 reflects the
recognition by Congress of the distinction between the even
handed treatment of qualified handicapped persons and
affirmative efforts to overcome the disabilities caused by
the handicaps."14 This decision was later cited by the D.C.
Circuit and upheld in 1981.75 The requirements imposed
on hospitals and physicians by the regulations would be,
determined the Court of Appeals, a particularly onerous
affirmative action" unintended by statute
76
In response, the government argued that the only af-
firmative step required of recipient hospitals by the final
rules is to post an informational notice .. . The posting
of this notice cannot be credibly argued to constitute the
kind of excessive regulation prohibited by the Davis doc-
trine 7 7
The court concluded that § 504 does not give authority
to interfere with medical treatment decisions involving
defective newborn infants. Accordingly, HHS's request to
continue its investigation by obtaining access to Baby Jane
Does medical records was denied.
78
In March and April 1984, hearings were held in an ac-
tion brought against HHS by the American Hospital
Association challenging the validity of the Baby Doe Regula-
tions.7 9 On plaintiffs' motions for summary judgment,
District Court Judge Brient held, without opinion, on the
basis of the Court of Appeals' decision in University
Hospital,8" that the regulations were not authorized by the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973. The Court held that the regula-
tions are "invalid, unlawful and must be set aside pursuant
to the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(c),
because promulgated without statutory authority."81
HHS appealed the decision, filing a writ of certiorari
on March 24, 1985. The Supreme Court granted the peti-
tion in August 1985. The question presented to the court
is as follows: "Does § 504 of 1973 Rehabilitation Act pro-
hibit hospital program[s] receiving Federal financial
assistance from withholding nourishment or medically in-
dicated treatment from [a] handicapped child, or otherwise
discriminating against [a] child, solely because of his
handicap?"82
A decision has yet to be reached in this case; however,
in light of the foregoing analysis, it will be interesting to see
just how far this Administration can go in legislating moral-
ity. As one particularly astute commentator observed:
The essential problem with the HHS regulations
is that they legislate and mandate the applica-
tion of a philosophy; their goal is not to pre-
vent discrimination or protect civil rights, but
rather to merely enforce a highly controversial
and narrowly focused point of view.83
In the context of life and death decisions in the
neonatal nursery, such a focus is not only inappropriate
but may, in fact, detract from and inhibit the development
of programs and support systems necessary to meet the
needs of the handicapped. The irony of this situation is
most apparent when one realizes the factual situation sur-
rounding the Supreme Courtfs ruling that § 504 does not
require affirmative action.
In Southeastern Community College v. Davis,8 4 the
Supreme Court considered the claims of a licensed prac-
tical nurse that her denial of admission to a college nurs-
ing program on the basis of her hearing disability violated
§ 504. The college had determined that Ms. Davis' impair-
ment was such that, even with a hearing aid, she would
be unable to participate fully in the program and function
effectively as a nurse. According to Ms. Davis, however, the
college should not have taken her handicap into account
in determining whether she was "otherwise qualified" for the
program, but rather, should have confined its inquiry to her
academic and technical qualifications. The Supreme Court
disagreed. As it stated, § 504, "by its terms, does not com-
pel educational institutions to disregard the disabilities of
handicapped individuals."8 - Nor does it require affirmative
action on the part of the institutions to modify a program
to accommodate the specific disabilities of an individual,
It is ironic, indeed, that § 504 has been interpreted by
the Administration to prohibit discrimination on behalf of
severely handicapped newborns, but has not been inter-
preted to provide Ms. Davis and other similarly situated in-
dividuals, who are only moderately handicapped, with the
support necessary to live a full and satisfying life.
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Conclusion
It will be interesting to see the effect of the forthcom-
ing Supreme Court decision in Heckler v. American
Hospital Associations 6 on the opportunities available to the
handicapped under § 504.
Will a broad reading of § 504, upholding the Baby Doe
Regulations, also imply an even broader reading of § 504's
authority; in other words, will Ms. Davis and other similar-
ly situated individuals now be allowed entry into programs
such as Southeastern? Or will a broad reading be so nar-
rowly construed to apply only in those cases which will fur-
ther the Administrations current ethical, moral and
philosophical viewpoints?
Conversely, if the lower court's opinion is upheld and
the regulations are declared invalid, will Ms. Davis' situa-
tion and others like hers become even more difficult? Or
will the decision be so narrowly construed as to have no
relationship, whatsoever, to the general authority of § 504?
Clearly, there are no simple solutions to the difficult
issues presented by the selective non-treatment of seriously
handicapped newborns. However, vague governmental
mandates are not only inappropriate, but may have
ramifications which extend far beyond the boundaries of
the neonatal nursery.
FOOTNOTES
1. Anencephaly is a condition of arrested development of the brain;
at least the cerebral hemispheres are absent, and sometimes the brain
is totally absent.
2. Hydranencephaly is a disorder characterized by the complete or
almost complete absence of the cerebral hemispheres.
3. Spina bifida cystica is an abnormality in which the vertebrae have
not fully developed.
4. Hydrocephalus is a disorder characterized by rapid enlargement
of the head caused by fluid pressure on the brain. When hydrocephalus
has appeared at birth and the undeveloped vertebrae are high on the spine,
many physicians recommend nontreatment Lorber, Early Results of Selec-
tive Treatment of Spina Bifida Cystica, Brit. Med. J., October 27, 1973,
at 201.
5. Meningomyelocele is a severe form of spina bifida cystica in which
there is a cystic lesion of the spinal column with evidence of neurological
dysfunction. This disorder ordinarily results in complete paralysis below
the lesion. Left untreated, 98% of spina bifida infants with men-
ingomyelocele die within a year. With adequate medical care, however,
spina bifida patients often reach adulthood. MacMillan, Birth Defective
Infants: A Standard, For Non Treatment Decisions, 30 Stan. L Rev. 599,
560, n. 4. (1978).
6. Downs Syndrome is a chromosomal abnormality characterized
by mental retardation, a thick and protruding tongue, almond-shaped eyes,
and a higher than normal susceptibility to infection.
7. Duodenal atresia is an abnormality often associated with Downs
Syndrome in which there is a complete absence or obstruction of a por-
tion of the upper part of the small intestine A minor surgical procedure
will alleviate the blockage, however, surveys of pediatricians and pediatric
surgeons repeatedly have shown that the majority of doctors polled either
would not recommend surgery or would acquiesce in parents' decisions
not to operate in such a case. Todres, Krane, Howill & Shannon, Pediatri-
cians' Attitudes Affecting Decision-Making in Defective Newborns, 60
Pediatrics 197, 198 (1977).
8. Microcephaly is a disorder characterized by abnormal smallness
of the head. Serious mental retardation usually results when the head size
is more than two standard deviations below normal size.
9. Myeloschisis is a condition characterized by a cleft spinal cord,
caused by the failure of the neural plate to form a complete tube. Newborns
with this disorder do not usually survive the first week of life.
10. Discriminating Against the Handicapped by Withholding Treat-
ment or Nourishment; Notice of Health Care Providers, 47 Fed. Reg. 26,
027 (1982).
11. Section 504 provides in relevant part: No otherwise qualified in-
dividual . . . shall solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from
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